Episode 29 · 2020-08-03 · 44:46 · Original in Finnish
Growth, institutions and Acemoğlu | Mika Maliranta | Negotiator 29
Originally published as “Talouskasvu Instituutiot Acemoğlu Mika Maliranta #neuvottelija 29”
Mika Maliranta, research professor at the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority, explains why firms exist at all (the Coase theorem), where the line runs between vertical and horizontal integration, and how natural monopolies are regulated. The second half takes up Acemoğlu and Robinson's institutional theory, The Narrow Corridor and Hayek: why good institutions are not adopted even when they are well known, why some institution always fills the gap — the mafia included — and why the Nordic model and earnings-related unemployment insurance actually encourage risk-taking.
Watch and listen
Key moments
- 00:00 — Maliranta's roles and the competition authority as a sports analogy
- 02:30 — Refereeing and groundskeeping: two different jobs
- 05:00 — Why firms exist: the Coase theorem and transaction costs
- 07:30 — Managerial authority, hierarchy and the edge of the market
- 10:00 — Vertical and horizontal integration
- 12:30 — Dominant market position and its abuse
- 15:00 — Natural monopolies and the regulatory toolkit
- 17:30 — Public goods and Acemoğlu's The Narrow Corridor
- 20:00 — Why good institutions are not adopted
- 22:30 — China's long institutional development
- 25:00 — Evolution, sexual selection and resources
- 27:30 — Kinship, cooperation and the need for institutions
- 30:00 — The mafia as an institution — something always fills the gap
- 32:30 — Why the Nordic model has held up
- 35:00 — The problem of measuring public-sector productivity
- 37:30 — Productivity growth as a win-win, and the terms of trade
- 40:00 — Safety, trust and happiness measurements
- 42:30 — Earnings-related security encourages risk-taking
- 45:00 — Closing
Summary
Mika Maliranta, research professor at the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority, explains why firms exist at all (the Coase theorem), where the line runs between vertical and horizontal integration, and how natural monopolies are regulated. The second half takes up Acemoğlu and Robinson’s institutional theory, The Narrow Corridor and Hayek: why good institutions are not adopted even when they are well known, why some institution always fills the gap — the mafia included — and why the Nordic model and earnings-related unemployment insurance actually encourage risk-taking.
Chapters
- 00:00 — Maliranta’s roles and the competition authority as a sports analogy
- 02:30 — Refereeing and groundskeeping: two different jobs
- 05:00 — Why firms exist: the Coase theorem and transaction costs
- 07:30 — Managerial authority, hierarchy and the edge of the market
- 10:00 — Vertical and horizontal integration
- 12:30 — Dominant market position and its abuse
- 15:00 — Natural monopolies and the regulatory toolkit
- 17:30 — Public goods and Acemoğlu’s The Narrow Corridor
- 20:00 — Why good institutions are not adopted
- 22:30 — China’s long institutional development
- 25:00 — Evolution, sexual selection and resources
- 27:30 — Kinship, cooperation and the need for institutions
- 30:00 — The mafia as an institution — something always fills the gap
- 32:30 — Why the Nordic model has held up
- 35:00 — The problem of measuring public-sector productivity
- 37:30 — Productivity growth as a win-win, and the terms of trade
- 40:00 — Safety, trust and happiness measurements
- 42:30 — Earnings-related security encourages risk-taking
- 45:00 — Closing
Watch
The recording lives on the Neuvottelija channel: Talouskasvu Instituutiot Acemoğlu Mika Maliranta #neuvottelija 29. A Finnish edition of this episode is published at www.neuvottelija.fi.
People and topics
Guests: Mika Maliranta
Topics: Finnish Economy & Policy