Episode 170 · 2023-01-15 · 54:30 · Original in Finnish
The Realism of War and Mearsheimer | Mika Aaltola | Negotiator 170
Originally published as “Sodan realismi Mearsheimer | Mika Aaltola | Neuvottelija 170”
Mika Aaltola, director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, goes through the first year of the war in Ukraine in diary form and marks where his own forecasts held and where they missed. The spine of the conversation is structural realism and Mearsheimer's sphere-of-influence thinking, which from a small state's vantage point is bleak and, historically, a poor predictor of stability. Aaltola also opens up the dynamics of Finland's NATO process, how Washington's signals should be read, and why public opinion turned before the political leadership did. He treats Russia's strategic culture as a durable structure and expects the war to end in a frozen conflict rather than a peace treaty.
Core theses
- Sphere-of-influence realism is a poor predictor of stability, and from a small state's position it is also a prescription for being traded away.
- Russia's strategic culture is a durable structure rather than one leader's preference, which is why its behaviour is more predictable than its rhetoric.
- In Finland's NATO process public opinion moved first and the political leadership followed, not the other way round.
- The likely end state is a frozen conflict, not a negotiated peace — which is a forecast about the shape of the settlement, not about who wins.
Watch and listen
Summary
Mika Aaltola, director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, goes through the first year of the war in Ukraine in diary form and marks where his own forecasts held and where they missed. The spine of the conversation is structural realism and Mearsheimer’s sphere-of-influence thinking, which from a small state’s vantage point is bleak and, historically, a poor predictor of stability. Aaltola also opens up the dynamics of Finland’s NATO process, how Washington’s signals should be read, and why public opinion turned before the political leadership did. He treats Russia’s strategic culture as a durable structure and expects the war to end in a frozen conflict rather than a peace treaty.
A forecast audit, not a commentary
The framing that makes this episode worth keeping is that Aaltola scores himself: he goes back through what he said during the first year and separates the calls that held from the ones that did not. That is a rarer thing in foreign-policy commentary than the commentary itself, and it is what the diary structure is for.
Why realism reads badly from Helsinki
Mearsheimer’s version of realism treats spheres of influence as the stable arrangement. Aaltola’s objection is partly empirical — the historical record does not show that stability — and partly positional: a small state on the boundary of a sphere is the thing being arranged, not a party to the arrangement.
Opinion ahead of leadership
On NATO, Aaltola’s reading is that the Finnish public moved first and the political leadership caught up. It is worth stating plainly because the opposite story — leaders bringing a reluctant public along — is the one usually told about accession.
Watch
The recording lives on the Neuvottelija channel: Sodan realismi Mearsheimer | Mika Aaltola | Neuvottelija 170. A Finnish edition of this episode is published at www.neuvottelija.fi.
In depth
The Neuvottelija AI editions carry a long-form write-up of this episode: English · suomeksi.
Go deeper
Explore the ideas in depth
Guides connected to this conversation, with frameworks and further reading.
Negotiation Strategy, Leverage and Power: Reading the Counterparty You Actually Have
A negotiation guide from the co-author of Neuvotteluvalta — the sources of leverage, BATNA and anchoring in practice, using information asymmetry, breaking deadlocks, and what to do when the counterparty negotiates on power rather than consensus. Grounded in Neuvottelija conversations and two decades of negotiation writing.
People and topics
Guests: Mika Aaltola
Topics: Geopolitics