EP423 · Society · first published 2026-11-17
Yalta 2: Putin, Xi and Trump | Arto Luukkanen | Negotiator 423
Docent Arto Luukkanen and Sami Miettinen compare the planned meeting of Trump, Xi and Putin in China with the 1945 Yalta conference, where the great powers settled post-war Europe and the small were left outside the room. In Luukkanen's reading, Russia turned the Abu Dhabi talks from peace in Ukraine to Europe's security order and wants a US withdrawal from Europe, Finland out of NATO and the Baltic states emptied of troops. The conversation runs from Finland's exit from the war in 1944 to the lopsided Sino-Russian alliance, Taiwan, the chip race and honey traps, and ends on Paasikivi's lesson: without strength you are treated as merchandise. The article checks the episode's historical claims and compares great-power negotiations then and now.
Yalta 2: Putin, Xi and Trump | Arto Luukkanen | Negotiator 423
Summary: In February 1945 Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met at Yalta to settle post-war Europe. Poland, whose borders they decided, was not at the table. Arto Luukkanen, a docent in Russian history and politics, sees the same set-up now that a three-way meeting of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin has been prepared in China. In his reading, Russia turned the Abu Dhabi talks on peace in Ukraine into talks on Europe’s security order, and Europe, which has no divisions, is left outside the room. The episode runs from Finland’s exit from the war in 1944 to the lopsided Sino-Russian alliance, Taiwan, the chip race, honey traps and European domestic politics. It ends on Paasikivi’s lesson: if you have no strength, you are treated as merchandise.
How to read this. The captions carry no speaker labels. Speakers are inferred from the conversation and the publisher’s description. Luukkanen was party secretary of the Finns Party from 2021 to 2023, and this is a current-affairs conversation between two right-of-centre speakers: judgements of parties, politicians and the media are their own. Miettinen says in the episode that he owns Nvidia shares. The episode’s historical claims were checked, and divergences are flagged in Correction notes. Current events were checked as far as public sources existed on 17 November 2026; the three-power meeting had not taken place or been confirmed at the time of recording. The closing analysis section is this article’s own interpretation, not the speakers’. A few jibes at named people are left out because they are not the subject of the episode. The conversation is in Finnish; quotations are translated.
Luukkanen’s previous visit, in October, covered his book on Russia’s transfers of power (Why Can’t Putin Show Weakness?, Negotiator 417). This conversation continues in the members-only episode Russian Books (Inner Circle 173).
1. The big three and the logic of force
Luukkanen sketches the current trio in his own way. Putin is “the leader of a disintegrating empire”, Trump the leader of “a middle-aged, gerontological empire”, and Xi Jinping the leader of a “super-empire” of 1.6 billion people. Xi, he notes, has just thrown out generals on a large scale, and people ask whether only obedient generals are being kept for a move on Taiwan.
The purges in China’s military are real. Central Military Commission vice-chair He Weidong was expelled in October 2025, and in January 2026 vice-chair Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were placed under investigation. According to CSIS this left Xi with practically one general beside him on the commission. The reading that the purges prepare a Taiwan operation is the speakers’.
The episode’s leitmotif comes from Stalin. When the Pope’s influence was praised to him, Stalin asked: “How many divisions does the Pope have?” Luukkanen’s conclusion: if you have strength, you have it, and if you don’t, “you are treated as merchandise. You are like a bag of sweets.”
Correction. The line comes from Churchill’s memoirs, which place it in Stalin’s reply to French foreign minister Pierre Laval in Moscow in May 1935. Other versions circulate, so it is best attributed “according to Churchill”.
2. What was actually agreed at Yalta
Miettinen asks Luukkanen to explain to younger listeners what the original Yalta was. In Luukkanen’s account the “big three”, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, met at Yalta “in spring ’45”, while the war was still on, and agreed on future spheres of influence. He describes the classic moment when Churchill scribbles percentages on a sheet: Romania 70 per cent to the Soviets and 30 to the West, Yugoslavia or Greece 50–50. Churchill, he says, played “an old-fashioned gentleman’s great-power game”. Stalin understood only that where there were Soviet soldiers, the command was his.
Stalin did not yet impose full Soviet rule, Luukkanen says. The policy was popular fronts that included “so-called democrats”, provided everyone broke with fascism. The lock turned only in 1946–1948, and Churchill spoke of an iron curtain at Fulton. Privately, Luukkanen says, Churchill remarked that “we may have killed the wrong pig”.
Correction. The Yalta conference took place on 4–11 February 1945, in winter. It adopted the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which promised free elections. It also agreed Poland’s eastern border roughly along the Curzon line, a “reorganisation” of the Lublin government, the founding conference of the UN and the Security Council veto. The Soviet Union promised to enter the war against Japan, receiving South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands in return. No separate spheres-of-influence treaty was signed at Yalta.
The percentages sheet Luukkanen describes is the percentages agreement that Churchill and Stalin made in Moscow on 9 October 1944, four months before Yalta. The figures were Romania 90/10 for the Soviets, Greece 90/10 for Britain, Yugoslavia and Hungary 50/50, Bulgaria 75/25. Churchill himself called it a “naughty document”. The Fulton iron-curtain speech was given on 5 March 1946. Churchill scholarship has found no source for the “wrong pig” line, and Richard Langworth considers it apocryphal.
At Potsdam (17 July–2 August 1945) Stalin “looked around and saw these weren’t the same blokes any more”, as Miettinen puts it: Roosevelt had died, Harry Truman represented the United States, and Churchill was replaced by Clement Attlee in the middle of the conference. Miettinen applies Luukkanen’s point to Finland: Stalin respected places where he had soldiers, and in Finland he had none.
3. Weak Europe is left out of the room
Luukkanen says today’s situation is the same. The weak party, Europe, with its “Lilliputian army, operetta battalions”, is left out of the talks. Small countries such as Finland and Norway are, in his words, “small change or a tasty dessert”. His example is Russia’s demand that Finland leave NATO.
4. Finland’s road to peace in 1944
Luukkanen calls Finland’s exit from the war “an incredible achievement”. In 1943 Finland put out feelers. In March 1944 J. K. Paasikivi travelled secretly to Moscow with Carl Enckell to hear Molotov’s peace terms. Molotov demanded that the Germans be removed from Finland, which the Finns said was impossible. The 1940 Peace of Moscow was offered as the basis. Molotov conceded, Luukkanen says, that the Finns had fought bravely, but “Moscow does not believe in tears”. Paasikivi came back demanding that the terms be accepted, but the political leadership judged that the army was intact and the terms made no sense. Germany learned of the talks “through the kitchen door”, and Hitler demanded that contacts be cut.
In June the great offensive began. The Finns first fell back in confusion, but resistance stiffened, and the decisive defence held only with German help. Ribbentrop came to Helsinki and demanded a political agreement of the kind Finland had refused until then. The solution was that President Risto Ryti gave the commitment personally: under his leadership Finland would not make a separate peace without negotiating with Germany. Luukkanen calls it “a cunning trick”, because Hitler could not imagine anyone giving up power. When the Soviet Union needed its troops for the drive on Berlin, Ryti resigned, peace terms were requested again, and Finland escaped occupation. The demand for unconditional surrender was dropped, and a control commission came instead. None of the decision-makers was a warmonger, Luukkanen says; after Stalingrad all of them were thinking about how to get out of the war.
Correction. Paasikivi and Enckell arrived in Moscow on 26 March 1944 and met Molotov on 27 March. The full terms were handed over on 29 March: the 1940 border, internment of the German troops, Petsamo and 600 million dollars in reparations (Foreign Relations of the United States). The Karelian Isthmus offensive began on 9–10 June 1944. Ribbentrop was in Helsinki on 22–24 June, and Ryti’s letter is dated 26 June 1944. Ryti resigned on 1 August, Mannerheim was made president by a special act on 4 August, and the armistice was signed in Moscow on 19 September 1944. In the war-responsibility trial Ryti was sentenced to ten years in prison.
Miettinen asks whether Karelia could have been kept in 1939 by trading Baltic islands, and mentions Neuvotteluvalta, the book he wrote with Juhana Torkki. The Baltic states fared as they fared once they accepted Soviet troops on their soil, but Miettinen wonders whether that bought time all the same. Luukkanen says there was no alternative in the Lapland War: the Russians demanded bloodshed at once, and if the Finns did not act, they stood ready to “help”. He praises the landing at Tornio as a brilliant operation and says the Finnish advance stopped when the troops found the Germans’ cognac in a depot.
Correction. The story is documented. The landing at Röyttä took place on 1 October 1944, and according to Yle Finnish troops found one of the largest German alcohol stores in Lapland at the “Little Berlin” depot in Tornio. The report says about one and a half battalions got drunk.
5. Trump after the midterms
Miettinen suggests that Putin plays Stalin’s role in the new trio and that Trump has been “somewhat castrated” by the midterms. The Democrats won, he says, and will remove Defense (“War”) Secretary Pete Hegseth once they control the chambers. Luukkanen points out that the president is still “like an emperor in a republic”: he commands the armed forces, has the veto and can act militarily for 60 days before he must seek Congress’s approval.
Correction. Early results show the Democrats winning both the House and the Senate on 3 November 2026. The new Congress convenes in January. Democrats have agreed to pursue Hegseth’s impeachment, but removal would need a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Luukkanen’s 60 days refers to the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
6. Abu Dhabi and Russia’s demands on Europe
Luukkanen sees a “big switch” in the Abu Dhabi talks. He compares Putin to the comic-book magician Mandrake, who makes a hypnotic gesture: the talk was no longer about peace but about “root causes”, meaning what Russia wants from Europe. In his reading Russia wants the United States to withdraw from Europe and NATO to promise not to use its nuclear deterrent. Finland would leave NATO, which would amount to political surrender, and the Baltic states would be stripped of troops and bases. Sweden, he says, is left alone. The Europe Russia wants is the Europe of before the Napoleonic wars: small principalities where oligarchs can go and “misbehave on the French Riviera”. Once the dish called Ukraine is finished, he says, the next dish is called the Baltics.
Miettinen recalls that the EU’s High Representative Kaja Kallas has called the demands maximalist. Kallas is good, Luukkanen says, but the problem is that she has no strength behind her.
Correction. The US–Ukraine–Russia trilateral talks took place in Abu Dhabi on 10–11 November 2026 and ended without a breakthrough. Europeans held parallel talks in Abu Dhabi but were not at the trilateral table (Kyiv Post). The Telegraph reported in October that Moscow would seek to roll NATO’s force posture back to 1997 levels, meaning out of Poland, the Baltics and Finland; that is a press report, not a confirmed official position. We found no public report of demands for a full US withdrawal or for Finland to leave NATO; Luukkanen’s list is his reading of Russia’s aims. Around 9 November Kallas rejected the idea of a “new European security architecture”, saying one already exists and Russia signed up to it (BusinessDay). On 11 November Russian foreign ministry official Alexei Drobinin floated bilateral non-aggression pacts with individual NATO members, which Luukkanen refers to later in the episode.
7. A coalition of the willing without soldiers
Take the United States out of the NATO equation, Luukkanen says, and Britain, France and Germany remain. For the coalition of the willing, which “sounds like some porn film”, about 10,000 soldiers were counted, while Ukraine has 900,000 under arms. “What do you do in Ukraine with a Swiss Guard like that?” The West has navies and air forces but no strength on land. On the border, Poland and Finland are reasonably strong.
Correction. Public proposals for a reassurance force for Ukraine have ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 troops, to deploy only after a ceasefire; no final number has been set. We did not check the figure for Ukraine’s forces.
8. Russia’s strength and the Baltics
Russia’s armed forces number 2.5 million, Luukkanen says, and the war in Ukraine ties all of them down. In 1941 the Soviet Union lost millions of men in the encirclements at Uman and Kyiv and still had people to spare. Now, he says, Russia cannot mobilise, because people do not want a war that is going badly. Against Europe alone, Russia is still a big power, and Putin is building a greater Russian empire “systematically and patiently”.
Miettinen disagrees about Russia’s strength. He describes a country with an economy the size of Italy’s, a third of whose oil refining Ukraine has destroyed with missiles. It has military capabilities, he says, but few economic ones, and he sees no grounds for Europe to bow to it. The disagreement about Russia’s real strength is left open in the episode. The speakers’ figures on Russia’s forces and oil-industry damage were not checked.
9. Why Western companies fail in Russia
Miettinen is puzzled by what he calls the Trump–Hegseth “real-estate game” of seeking stakes in assets such as Lukoil’s foreign businesses. Luukkanen says history teaches otherwise. When Russia was on its knees in the 1990s, American companies wanted in, but foreigners were never allowed a controlling position. Minority stakes were possible, always on terms that let the owners be kicked out. He cites BP. Russians guard their gas and oil wealth “jealously”. The Finnish example he gives is Fortum’s investment in Siberian power generation; six billion of taxpayers’ money went there, he says, and was lost. We did not check that figure. His advice to finance directors: take a historian along to remind you that the world was not created yesterday. Miettinen says China treats technology partners the same way, and Luukkanen quotes Schiller: “The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.”
10. Nvidia, Taiwan and honey traps
Miettinen raises the scandal around Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang. He says “spy women” started turning up around Huang just now, and finds the timing suspicious because Nvidia is the bridge in the Taiwan–US chip partnership. Miettinen says he owns Nvidia shares and that the entire Western AI empire rests on one company.
Correction. According to The New York Times, US intelligence suspected China’s Ministry of State Security of a honey trap aimed at Huang. Huang admitted an affair, Nvidia’s board opened an inquiry on 8 November, and according to NPR Huang resigned. NPR had not independently confirmed the Times’s intelligence reporting. China denies the allegations.
Luukkanen says he has read KGB manuals on how to turn a person. First you find the weakness: gambling, drugs, women or “perverse pleasures”. Men get a honey trap; women get a “Romeo trap”, in which a politician’s lonely secretary meets a charming man. Sex is not the main thing, he says; what matters is that the target feels listened to and loved. It is an “imitation of feelings” and “evil psychology”.
11. China remembers the Convention of Peking
Miettinen suggests that Xi might even rescue the fate of “us Chukhnas”, since Russia once took Manchuria and the Kurils. Luukkanen says China remembers its history. In the 1860 Convention of Peking the Russian envoy Nikolai Ignatyev won Russia a vast stretch of the Far East, perhaps Russia’s biggest territorial gain ever. Miettinen calls it a “reverse Alaska”. The Chinese consider the territory theirs.
In the Sino-Russian alliance, Luukkanen says, Russia has become the “younger brother”. If Russia weakens or falls into a power struggle, China will exploit it with demands alone. He says China buys Russian gas and oil at about a 66 per cent discount because it can afford not to pay market prices; we did not check the size of the discount. China, Iran, Turkey and Russia form, in his words, “a club of crooks” in which the others shamelessly exploit Russia’s weakness.
Correction. The order of the border treaties is different. The Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 favoured the Qing: Russia gave up the Amur basin. Russia gained the left bank of the Amur through the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Ussuri region, today’s Primorye, through the Convention of Peking in 1860.
12. Turkey, Dugin and the war of world-views
Erdoğan’s Turkey, Luukkanen says, advances in the Caucasus as it pleases, and Russia has even had to swallow Turkey shooting down a Russian jet. Erdoğan’s dream is a revival of the Ottoman Empire as far as Aleppo. Miettinen wants to give Turkey hope because of Atatürk’s legacy and its NATO membership. Luukkanen says the legacy is honoured in public and whittled away all the time.
On Taiwan, the speakers ask whether Trump is ready to sell old alliances: Europe to Russia and Taiwan to China. Luukkanen frames it as a war of world-views. He explains how Aleksandr Dugin and his circle talk of “Gayropa” and “liberasts” and see Europe as decadent and cut off from its own history. Dugin tells Europe that Russia does not want to attack, only for Europe to find its “historical identity”. To Ukraine the message is different: we love you like brothers, but we will destroy you. Beside this ideological wing stands Konstantin Malofeyev’s Orthodox-conservative current. Russia’s oligarchs, Luukkanen says, live quite differently themselves: on yachts, in villas and on Tuscan wine estates, far from the Protestant work ethic of the Rockefellers.
13. The French election and Marine Le Pen
Luukkanen predicts that Marine Le Pen will win the first round of the French presidential election, and that voters will prefer her to the “rabble-rousing communist” Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Le Pen could become a tough woman like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, he says. Miettinen is bothered by Le Pen’s friendliness towards Russia. Luukkanen agrees that it would be a big win for Russia, because France’s nuclear arsenal would no longer be pointed at it. His call on Le Pen is a forecast.
Correction. Luukkanen’s point about the dates is right. Finland’s parliamentary election will be held on 18 April 2027, and the first round of the French presidential election falls on the same day. The run-off is on 2 May 2027.
14. Taiwan’s defence and the AI race
Taiwan is not an easy nut for China, Luukkanen says. The island is “carved full of caves”, Taiwanese want to defend themselves, and the strait is a moat. In his view China and Russia were impressed by how the United States destroyed Iran’s navy, air force and missiles in its strikes. Western military technology is decisive, and divisions do not help if you cannot get them there. A Korean War-style mass assault no longer works, he says.
Miettinen notes that China has rare earths, robotics, energy and AI expertise. He asks who will win the AI race and answers himself: “Never bet against Uncle Sam.” In his view the Communist Party’s surveillance paralyses people, and when AI takes jobs, the party will not be able to find work for them.
15. Zheng He, the East India Company and the tech giants
For Luukkanen the biggest difference between China and the West shows in history. China reached India some 80 years before Vasco da Gama, when the eunuch admiral Zheng He sailed there with a great fleet, but the imperial administration decided it had no need for such things. In Portugal and Spain kings backed voyages of discovery, and expansiveness, driven by the love of money, is part of the Western cultural inheritance, he says. Miettinen calls the East India Company the first joint-stock “venture”. Giants such as Nvidia, Google and SpaceX, he says, have returned to that role, as when Elon Musk can switch Ukraine’s Starlink links off and on.
Correction. Zheng He reached Calicut on his first voyage of 1405–1407, and Vasco da Gama in 1498, a gap of about 90 years. The English East India Company was chartered as a joint-stock company in 1600, but the first to issue freely tradable shares was the Dutch VOC in 1602.
16. Money decides great-power deals
Miettinen asks whether “tech lords” are also lurking behind the scenes of Yalta 2. Luukkanen says that in big deals money always “sets the tempo of the waltz”. Trump wants a showy deal because he has two years left to write his name into history. Miettinen sees Xi’s weakness as ideological: he has not let entrepreneurs like Jack Ma rise, so China lacks “the Rockefellers of our time” it could send out to negotiate.
17. The Mandate of Heaven, Mao and Deng
Luukkanen says such oligarchs are impossible in China because they cannot be controlled. He explains the old idea of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming): the ruler is the son of heaven, obliged to govern well and without corruption, and if he breaks that duty the mandate is withdrawn. The classic case is the Zhou dynasty replacing the wicked Shang. Dynasties rise and fall through peasant revolts such as the Red Eyebrows and the Taiping Rebellion.
Xi, Luukkanen says, has made himself a ruler such as even Mao Zedong was not. The current leadership holds that Mao was “nine parts good, one part bad”. The crimes of the Cultural Revolution are acknowledged, and 60 million people died in the famine, he says. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms rediscovered a patriotic Chinese idea: agriculture produced the first capital, and capitalism was allowed under party control. In Russia, nothing new emerged from the creative chaos of perestroika because it was not allowed to. His conclusion is that China’s capacity for change is far more dynamic than Russia’s.
Correction. Two points are mixed up. The Communist Party’s 1981 resolution calls Mao’s merits “primary” and his errors “secondary”, and the well-known formula is Deng’s “70 per cent right, 30 per cent wrong”. “Nine fingers against one” was Mao’s own phrase, used to defend the Great Leap Forward in 1959. The great famine of 1959–1961 was caused by the Great Leap Forward, not the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Death estimates range from 15–30 million to Frank Dikötter’s at least 45 million.
18. Stalin rehabilitated, the front as a prison camp
In today’s Russia, Luukkanen says, Stalin has been rehabilitated as a “great and wise leader” and master (khozyain), and with him the use of terror. He recalls Molotov saying in old age that it was good to destroy the opposition before the war, because otherwise it would have “whined and whimpered” during it.
Correction. Molotov defended the 1937 purges as removing a “fifth column” in Felix Chuev’s interview book Molotov Remembers (1993). The quotation is Luukkanen’s paraphrase.
Today’s gulag, Luukkanen says, is the Ukrainian front: first prison, then the front line. Miettinen says Russia is abolishing the so-called coffin money, and Luukkanen says this has caused grumbling, because many soldiers’ wives were counting on the payout.
Correction. These are regional cuts, not a federal decision. According to Ukrainska Pravda, Bashkortostan cut the payment to families of fallen soldiers from two million roubles to one hundred thousand, Orenburg ended payments for deaths after the end of June, and Saratov cut them tenfold from 1 November 2026.
19. The small homeland and the babushkas
Russians, Luukkanen says, see their country in two ways. They are loyal to the great homeland, but what matters most is the “small homeland”: the closest friends, with whom you talk at the kitchen table and for whom you will do almost anything. Nothing is expected from the great homeland. Russian society is men’s in public, he says, but a matriarchy behind the front door, where the babushka keeps order.
As an example of babushka power he tells of 2005, when the state replaced pensioners’ benefits with cash and, for example, raised public transport fares. Pensioners took to the streets and no one dared beat them, because hitting an old woman is bad karma in Russia. The government quickly backed down. Miettinen asks whether the West, instead of honey traps, should “game the babushka energy” against Putin, now that the war needs the grandsons of St Petersburg and Moscow.
Correction. Law 122-FZ, which turned benefits into cash, took effect on 1 January 2005 and triggered the biggest protests since 2000. Moscow and some other regions restored benefits, and Putin promised that free travel would return and pensions would rise (Al Jazeera). The government partially backed down.
Luukkanen also mentions a “Putin’s army” of Krasnodar pensioners who supposedly invited Elon Musk to move to Russia. We found no such case. In 2019 entrepreneurs in Krasnodar invited Musk to a business forum with a billboard and a music video, and he joined by video link (The Moscow Times).
20. Germany should wake up
The world has never respected the weak, Luukkanen says, and Germany is the foundation of Europe. Germany has been “coddled and kept in swaddling clothes” since the war, and should now grow up as a state and take responsibility. In Britain the electoral system gives the winner a crushing majority with which harsh laws can be passed quickly. Germany’s Christian Democrats and Social Democrats will be swept aside, he says, once the middle-class revolt begins. Isolating the AfD does not work in his view, and Finland’s experience is that election winners must be given responsibility. Miettinen adds Germany’s gas policy with Putin, the closure of its nuclear plants and the troubles of its car industry.
21. The border law, Tanner and the sensible Social Democrats
On Finnish politics, the speakers turn to the Social Democrats’ meeting and the border law. Luukkanen says the party leadership made it clear that those who want to be ministers vote for the law. He hopes the demand for adulthood that Väinö Tanner once represented is returning to the party. Tanner dared to oppose the White command in 1918, negotiated with Stalin eye to eye and, Luukkanen says, kept the Finnish labour movement Western and democratic: “He saved Finnish democracy.” That is why Stalin made him a villain. Miettinen says he was surprised to find “sensible Social Democrats” in history who sat in the wartime government and built the cooperative movement. Luukkanen also praises Kalevi Sorsa as a skilled writer and says that as Finns Party secretary he set up working groups on Sorsa’s model.
Luukkanen wants some form of lustration, a critical study of the recent past. His example is the gas pipeline projects: he says it should be examined how certain people received money from the Russian state or companies close to it to promote them, and that the media does not dare to take this on. The claim is general and names no one.
Correction. We found no result for the vote on extending the border law. In 2025 the law passed 168–29, with six Social Democrat MPs allowed to vote against; Krista Kiuru was one of them and has declined to comment (Verkkouutiset).
22. Paasikivi, Porkkala and the bag of sweets
The episode closes with Paasikivi. When Porkkala was returned and the Finno-Soviet treaty extended, some demanded Karelia back too, Luukkanen says. Paasikivi’s answer was roughly: get an American soldier boy to help, and it’s sorted. Stalin, for his part, answered requests to restore old borders with: write to Peter the Great about it. Luukkanen’s conclusion repeats the opening: without strength you are a bag of sweets, and it does not help that something breaches the UN Charter. “That crying doesn’t help at all.”
Correction. The Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed on 6 April 1948. The return of Porkkala was agreed in September 1955 and the area handed back on 26 January 1956, as the treaty was extended (Finnish Government).
Miettinen recalls commenting to Yle on Finland’s NATO process and Erdoğan: a negotiation begins with getting to the table at all. Either you are at the table or you are not, and if you are not, nothing moves. Outside the table, Luukkanen says, you are “the coffee cup being talked about”. Europe is not being invited to the table now; a children’s table has been laid next to it, with “soft drinks and buns”. He asks whether anything was done in the window of opportunity after 2022. Miettinen’s answer is that Finland has capabilities, and now it must put its negotiators at the table and look the Stalins in the eye “with Väinö Tanner’s gaze”. Finally Miettinen raises France, Europe’s biggest debtor: if a euro crisis comes, it will not be Greece, Ireland or Portugal but France.
Analysis: great-power negotiations in 1944–1945 and now
This section is the article’s own interpretation. It rests on the facts checked above, but the speakers did not put it in this form.
1. The Yalta parallel fits the table, not the treaty. At Yalta three allies were winning a war against a common enemy and agreed on an order they meant to uphold together. At the meeting planned for the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China (KSAT/AP), three rivals would sit down, one of them a party to the war. The similarity is structural. At Yalta Poland’s borders were decided without Poland, and in Abu Dhabi the Europeans negotiated in side rooms, not at the trilateral table. That is why the parallel works, even though there is no treaty yet.
2. Paper holds only as far as force on the ground. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe promised free elections, and the Moscow percentages sheet divided influence in the Balkans. Luukkanen’s point about Stalin is central here: where Soviet soldiers stood, Stalin decided, whatever was written down. In a negotiator’s terms, what an agreement says matters less than each side’s alternatives if it is not kept. Europe, whose proposed reassurance force runs to 10,000–30,000 troops, has a weak position in that sense, and Luukkanen’s “divisions” are its measure.
3. Finland in 1944 is a case study in small-party negotiation. Three features of Finland’s exit recur in the negotiation literature. First, the channel was kept open in March even though the terms were rejected. Second, the negotiating position improved when the front stabilised in summer: the defensive victory and the Soviet need to shift troops towards Berlin changed Moscow’s calculation from unconditional surrender to an armistice without occupation. Third, Ryti’s personal commitment to Ribbentrop was a limited mandate: it bound only the president, so it lapsed when the president changed. Luukkanen calls it “a cunning trick”. The price was still high: the 1940 borders, Petsamo, 300 million dollars in reparations, the lease of Porkkala and, later, Ryti’s prison sentence.
4. Bilateral offers drive a wedge. The Russian foreign ministry’s suggestion of bilateral non-aggression pacts with individual NATO members follows the same logic as the 1944 percentages sheet: the whole is cut into pieces negotiated one at a time. When a small party accepts a separate deal, it strengthens its counterpart against everyone else. Paasikivi’s “bag of sweets” is the opposite case. A small party avoids becoming merchandise only if it has strength of its own or an ally whose strength counts as its own. Russia’s demand that Finland leave NATO, in Luukkanen’s reading, would remove exactly that.
5. The open question is America’s price. The speakers ask whether Trump is ready to sell Europe to Russia and Taiwan to China, and leave the question open; so does this article. In 1945 the United States got at Yalta a Soviet promise to fight Japan and support for the UN. No comparable trade has been made public now. Luukkanen says Trump wants a showy deal before his time runs out. What that deal contains will decide whether history repeats itself or merely rhymes.
Takeaways
- The table comes before the treaty. At Yalta Poland’s borders were decided without Poland. Luukkanen says Europe is now in the same position as the great powers discuss its security.
- Force on the ground beats paper. Stalin kept the Yalta promises only where he had no soldiers. Luukkanen’s conclusion is that a state without strength is treated as merchandise.
- Finland in 1944 is the model. The channel stayed open, the position improved as the front stabilised, and Ryti’s personal commitment lapsed when the president changed.
- China is Russia’s elder brother. Luukkanen says China remembers the land cessions of 1858 and 1860 and exploits Russia’s weakness.
- Many of the day’s claims are interpretation. The Abu Dhabi talks, the bilateral pact offers and the Huang affair are real, but Luukkanen’s list of Russian demands is his reading, not a confirmed official position.
Chapters
- 00:00 The big three and the logic of force
- 01:30 Arto Luukkanen and two black shirts
- 03:18 Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping as a new Yalta
- 04:03 What was agreed at Yalta in 1945
- 06:22 Weak Europe is left out of the room
- 07:27 Finland’s road to peace in 1944
- 08:49 Ryti’s commitment and Ribbentrop’s help
- 10:34 Could Karelia have been kept?
- 12:08 Trump’s position after the midterms
- 13:22 Abu Dhabi and Russia’s demands on Europe
- 15:11 A coalition of the willing without soldiers
- 16:38 Russia’s forces and the Baltics next
- 18:46 Why Western companies fail in Russia
- 21:54 Nvidia, Taiwan and the spy game
- 22:33 Honey traps and KGB manuals
- 25:24 China remembers the 1860 Convention of Peking
- 27:02 Russia as China’s younger brother
- 27:40 Erdoğan, Turkey and the Ottoman dream
- 30:37 Is Trump ready to sell Taiwan?
- 32:07 Aleksandr Dugin and the war of world-views
- 34:06 The oligarchs’ lives and the Protestant ethic
- 35:50 The French election and Marine Le Pen
- 37:48 Sanna Marin and the victory of capitalism
- 39:05 Taiwan’s defence and chip production
- 41:06 Will China or the United States win the AI race?
- 42:41 Zheng He and Western expansiveness
- 44:12 The East India Company and the tech giants
- 47:08 Money decides great-power deals
- 48:45 The Mandate of Heaven and the cycle of dynasties
- 51:09 Mao, Deng and China’s capacity for change
- 52:47 Stalin’s rehabilitation in today’s Russia
- 54:09 The Ukrainian front as the new prison camp
- 55:26 The small homeland and the power of the babushkas
- 57:46 When pensioners forced the government to back down
- 1:01:07 Germany should wake from its sleep
- 1:03:57 The rise of the left and the backlash
- 1:06:41 The border law and the Social Democrats’ vote
- 1:07:45 Väinö Tanner and the legacy of sensible Social Democrats
- 1:11:08 Lustration and the gas pipeline money
- 1:12:26 The green left’s children’s party is over
- 1:14:19 Paasikivi, Porkkala and the bag of sweets
- 1:15:43 Negotiation begins with getting to the table
- 1:17:34 France’s debt and the threat of a euro crisis
- 1:19:20 Thanks, and Luukkanen’s Russia books in the Inner Circle
Episode details. Neuvottelija 423, published 17 November 2026, length 1:20:19, YouTube id fFBld_dRTiY. Guest Arto Luukkanen, host Sami Miettinen. Based on the host’s own Finnish caption track and the publisher’s 44 chapters. Continued in the members-only episode Russian Books (Inner Circle 173).
Sources
- Episode: Jalta 2 Putin Xi Trump | Arto Luukkanen | Neuvottelija 423, YouTube, 17 November 2026.
- Yalta: Office of the Historian: The Yalta Conference, 1945; Avalon Project: Yalta (Crimea) Conference.
- Percentages agreement: International Churchill Society.
- Fulton: National Churchill Museum: The Sinews of Peace. “Wrong pig”: Richard Langworth.
- Potsdam: Office of the Historian: The Potsdam Conference, 1945.
- Finland 1944: Foreign Relations of the United States 1944, vol. III, d529; Ryti–Ribbentrop Agreement; Yle: the Tornio alcohol store.
- Russia and China: Treaty of Nerchinsk, Treaty of Aigun, Convention of Peking.
- China: Zheng He; Great Chinese Famine; CSIS: Xi’s purges of China’s military.
- Russia 2005: Al Jazeera: Putin reform suffers setback. Coffin money: Ukrainska Pravda, 6 November 2026.
- Porkkala: Finnish Government: Porkkala return anniversary.
- Three-power meeting: KSAT/AP, 6 November 2026.
- Abu Dhabi: Kyiv Post, Kyiv Post. Kallas: BusinessDay, 9 November 2026. Bilateral pacts: Novaya Gazeta Europe, 11 November 2026.
- Jensen Huang: KPBS/NPR, 12 November 2026.
- Midterms: OPB, 4 November 2026.
- Election dates: City of Helsinki: 2027 parliamentary election; The Jakarta Post: French presidential vote on April 18 and May 2.
- Border law: Verkkouutiset.
- Krasnodar and Musk, 2019: The Moscow Times.
- Arto Luukkanen: Kaleva: the Finns Party secretary changes.