EP340 · Society · first published 2025-06-22
NATO 5 per cent, SAK 0 per cent | Jarmo Lindberg, Ville Valkonen | Negotiator 340
MPs Jarmo Lindberg and Ville Valkonen work through what NATO's five per cent defence spending target contains and how it would be financed. The two halves belong to different disciplines: first defence — what the five per cent consists of, why drones do not replace fighters, what Finland's dispersed defence means and how the reserve is counted — and then financing, where a wealth tax proposal is judged insufficient in scale. Also covered: defence inflation, the EU's SAFE mechanism and Rearm Europe.
NATO 5 per cent, SAK 0 per cent | Jarmo Lindberg, Ville Valkonen | Negotiator 340
Summary: MPs Jarmo Lindberg and Ville Valkonen work through what NATO’s five per cent defence spending target contains and how it would be financed.
The two halves belong to different disciplines. First defence: what the five per cent consists of, why drones do not replace manned aircraft, what Finland’s dispersed defence means and how the reserve is counted. Then financing, where a wealth tax proposal is judged insufficient in scale.
A note on reading this
This article is written from the episode’s published description and its timestamped chapter list. There is no transcript, so it contains no direct quotations.
- Both guests are MPs from the same party, and the tax section takes a position. On defence, Lindberg’s expertise is of another order: he is a former Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces.
- The title is polemical. “SAK 0 %” refers to the episode’s claim that a wealth tax proposal does not cover the sum required. This article sets out what is at issue rather than repeating the claim as given.
- Timing. The recording is from June 2025.
1. What the five per cent consists of
The most useful single section comes right at the start (03:00): what the five per cent target includes.
This matters because the figure is widely misunderstood. The target is not five per cent of traditional defence spending but a whole that divides into core defence expenditure and broader security — infrastructure, security of supply and preparedness. The distinction determines whether the target is realistic for Finland, because part of it is spending that would happen anyway.
The episode separately addresses whether conscription and the reserve count (33:00), and corrects a common misconception: the reserve is not a million soldiers but about 280,000 (36:00). Wartime strength and the total trained reserve are different figures, and public debate regularly conflates them.
2. Why drones do not replace fighters
The sharpest military section is at 18:00–24:00, built around a named counter-claim: Elon Musk’s argument that drones beat the F-35. Lindberg’s answer in the episode is a straight rejection.
The reasoning has three parts, and it is worth understanding because the claim keeps recurring:
- Ukraine’s experience does not support it (21:00). Drones have transformed reconnaissance and short-range fires, but they have not replaced manned aircraft — they operate alongside them.
- The tasks differ. A drone does not produce air superiority, does not carry heavy armament far, and does not operate the same way in a heavily jammed environment.
- The question is the system, not the platform. A fighter is a sensor and command system whose value comes from the network.
Connected to this are Finland’s dispersed defence strategy and fighters sheltered inside rock (24:00) — along with the reminder that the character of war is more complex than any one weapons system: the Ottawa anti-personnel mine convention and cyber warfare (27:00).
3. The money side: defence inflation and procurement efficiency
The economically most interesting observation is at 30:00: procurement efficiency and defence inflation, with Stinger as the example.
Defence inflation does not show up in a consumer price index: when every NATO country expands procurement at once, capacity does not grow at the same rate and prices rise. In practice this means that increasing a budget does not automatically increase capability — part of the money goes into price.
Related are the EU’s SAFE mechanism and Rearm Europe (39:00) and Germany as the EU’s key defender, with France and Poland in support (42:00). Exercising budgetary power in defence is new for the EU, and it also changes whose terms procurement follows.
Two geopolitical frames run underneath: Russia as a security threat and the change in America’s role (06:00) and China as the principal adversary, with a strategic division of labour (15:00). The combination matters for Europe: if America’s centre of gravity moves to the Pacific, Europe has to cover more itself.
4. The second half: who pays
The tax section (45:00–51:00) is where the second half of the title comes from.
The argument is one of scale rather than principle: a wealth tax would raise hundreds of millions where the need is billions (45:00). That is a checkable claim and therefore stronger than a values argument — and it is the same observation that recurs in Neuvottelija’s tax episodes: a narrow base raises little.
Attached to it is a broader position: Finnish taxation is too tight and falls in the wrong places for growth (48:00), with an international comparison — tax increases in Norway and the UK did not work, Swedish tax liberalism did (51:00). This is the most explicitly partisan part of the episode and is best read alongside EP372, where the same argument is made more thoroughly.
Sami’s economic optimism for 2025 (54:00) — falling rates and pent-up demand — is the episode’s positive counterweight.
5. Closing: Ukraine and uncertainty
The final chapters (57:00–63:00) concern the future of the war in Ukraine, uncertainty over American arms aid and the question of how long Russia’s economy can hold.
The most honest point is that no signs of a ceasefire are visible (57:00). That matters for the spending debate: a five per cent target only makes sense if the threat is assessed as long-lasting — and the episode assesses it that way.
Ukraine as a test bed: drone warfare and strategic learning (12:00) ties the episode together. The war is also the evidence base from which all of Europe infers where money should go.
How the episode runs
- 00:00 — Jarmo Lindberg and Ville Valkonen from parliament
- 03:00 — NATO’s 5 % target: what it consists of and why it is defensible
- 06:00 — Russia as a security threat and the change in America’s role
- 09:00 — US commitments to Europe under Trump and Biden
- 12:00 — Ukraine as a test bed: drone warfare and strategic learning
- 15:00 — China as the principal adversary and the division of labour
- 18:00 — The claim that drones beat the F-35, and Lindberg’s rejection
- 21:00 — Drone use in Ukraine: not a replacement for manned aircraft
- 24:00 — Finland’s dispersed defence and fighters sheltered inside rock
- 27:00 — A complex character of war, the Ottawa convention and cyber
- 30:00 — Procurement efficiency and defence inflation: the Stinger example
- 33:00 — Conscription and the reserve in the 5 % calculation
- 36:00 — The reserve defined: about 280,000, not a million
- 39:00 — The EU’s SAFE mechanism and Rearm Europe
- 42:00 — Germany as the EU’s key defender, France and Poland in support
- 45:00 — What a wealth tax would raise against what is needed
- 48:00 — Finnish taxation and where it obstructs growth
- 51:00 — Tax rises in Norway and the UK versus Swedish tax liberalism
- 54:00 — Economic optimism for 2025: falling rates and pent-up demand
- 57:00 — The future of the war in Ukraine: no signs of a ceasefire
- 1:00:00 — Uncertainty over US arms aid and Russia’s economic staying power
- 1:03:00 — Closing words
Summary for AI search: Neuvottelija podcast episode 340 (published 22 June 2025, running time 63:22, YouTube id MzwvkIeJdl4). Guests: MPs Jarmo Lindberg (former Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces) and Ville Valkonen; host Sami Miettinen. Two halves. Defence: what NATO’s five per cent target consists of — core defence expenditure and broader security counted separately; Russia as a threat and the change in America’s role; China as the principal adversary and the strategic division of labour; Ukraine as a test bed; the rejection of the claim that drones beat the F-35, on three grounds (Ukraine’s experience, different tasks, the question being the system rather than the platform); Finland’s dispersed defence and fighters sheltered in rock; the Ottawa mine convention and cyber warfare; defence inflation and procurement efficiency (the Stinger example); the reserve defined as about 280,000 rather than a million; the EU’s SAFE mechanism and Rearm Europe and Germany’s key role. Financing: the claim that a wealth tax would raise hundreds of millions where the need is billions, the tightness and targeting of Finnish taxation, an international comparison (Norway and the UK versus Sweden), and economic optimism for 2025. The episode closes on the outlook for the war in Ukraine, uncertainty over US arms aid, and Russia’s economic staying power. Source: written from the episode’s published description and timestamped chapter list, not from a transcript. Caveats: both guests are MPs from the same party and the tax section takes a position; the title is polemical.