---
title: "An MP explains a tax rise, and the table does not agree | Weekly Wiseguys, 23 April 2024"
summary: "Sami Miettinen, MP Onni Rostila and — arriving late — Tere Sammallahti on Ivan Puopolo's Weekly Wiseguys, 23 April 2024, just after Petteri Orpo's government had agreed €1.5 billion in tax rises including a VAT increase to 25.5 per cent. This is the exception in the series: an MP from a governing party sits and explains the decision to people who disagree with it, and the disagreement runs the whole way through. Both sides make their best case, and both are recorded here."
datePublished: 2024-04-23
dateModified: 2024-04-23
originalLang: en
section: satire
sections: ["satire","economy","society"]
authors: ["Sami Miettinen"]
tags: ["Media-vierailu","Viikon viisastelu","Weekly Wiseguys","Ivan Puopolo","Onni Rostila","Tere Sammallahti","Verotus","Arvonlisävero","Julkinen talous","Hallituspolitiikka","Mediakritiikki"]
canonical: https://www.neuvottelija.com/ai/viisastelu-oikeistohallitus-ja-veronkorotukset-spesiaali/
---
# An MP explains a tax rise, and the table does not agree | Weekly Wiseguys, 23 April 2024

# An MP explains a tax rise, and the table does not agree | Weekly Wiseguys, 23 April 2024

> **Summary:**
> Sami Miettinen, MP Onni Rostila and — arriving late — Tere Sammallahti on Ivan Puopolo's Weekly Wiseguys, 23 April 2024, just after Petteri Orpo's government had agreed €1.5 billion in tax rises including a VAT increase to 25.5 per cent. This is the exception in the series: an MP from a governing party sits and explains the decision to people who disagree with it, and the disagreement runs the whole way through. Both sides make their best case, and both are recorded here.

This is a summary on Neuvottelija AI. The episode itself is on Ivan Puopolo’s channel and is his — [watch the original](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPwGuk381D0). The appearance is catalogued at [neuvottelija.com/media](https://www.neuvottelija.com/media/viisastelu-right-bloc-tax-rises-special/), which is the canonical home of this content.

> **A note on reading this.** Weekly Wiseguys is a tongue-in-cheek political panel, not a news broadcast. The speakers are right-of-centre commentators and politicians talking in their own names, sharpening for effect and joking as they go. This article sorts their arguments and marks who said what; it takes no position on who is right, and it does not reproduce the personal jabs. Speakers are named only where the recording itself identifies who is talking: the transcript carries no speaker labels, so uncertain passages are attributed to the panel or to "one of the guests" rather than to a name. The opinions are the speakers’ own.

---

## The panel

**Ivan Puopolo** hosts; the guests are **Sami Miettinen** and Finns Party MP **Onni Rostila**,
with **Tere Sammallahti** arriving halfway through. Recorded on 23 April 2024, shortly after the
government agreed roughly €1.5 billion in tax rises, the largest single item being an increase
in the standard rate of VAT to 25.5 per cent.

**This episode is the exception in the series.** In the others the panel criticises somebody who
is not in the room. Here an MP from a governing party sits and explains the decision to people
who openly disagree with it — and the disagreement lasts the whole hour. The host opens with a
warning that voices will be raised and people will talk over each other.

So this write-up is built differently from the others: **each side's best argument is recorded
separately.**

## The defence: why taxes were raised

**Onni Rostila** offers five reasons. They are not of equal strength, and they are set out here
as given.

1. **This was flagged before the election.** According to Rostila, both the party leadership and
   he himself had said that if the forecasts deteriorated significantly, cuts alone would not
   suffice. The claim is checkable and is not disputed in the episode.
2. **The EU deficit procedure.** On the autumn and winter forecasts, about €3 billion in
   additional adjustment was needed or Finland would have entered the procedure.
3. **A four-party compromise.** The outcome is a negotiated result in which every party has its
   protected items. Rostila names this directly as the reason his own line did not prevail.
4. **The time constraint.** The speed of cuts is limited by the fact that much public spending
   is statutory. Removing an obligation requires legislation that takes six months to a year —
   so cutting mid-year lands where there is no obligation rather than where the spending is.
5. **The service floor.** The more you cut, the closer you come to the point where a service
   stops functioning — and that becomes campaign material at the next election.

Rostila also makes a **strategic argument** that is the most interesting thing in this stretch:
if cutting drives administrative services into crisis, the left gets a tool with which to
reverse the whole adjustment. He is not claiming cuts are wrong, but that their dosage is a
political calculation.

And he concedes his own position: *"I would happily have cut a great deal more myself."*

## The attack: why that will not do

**Sami Miettinen** answers with five arguments, some checkable and some positions. They are
worth separating.

**Checkable:**

- **Where the VAT rate sits internationally.** A standard rate of 25.5 per cent is among the
  highest in the world — behind Hungary's 27 per cent and effectively second in the world, above
  the 25 per cent of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Croatia. This is correct.
- **The most concrete proposal in the episode:** print, next to every tax in the budget
  document, Finland's international ranking in that tax, in brackets. It is cheap, doable and
  hard to argue against — and it is offered seriously.
- **A correction made mid-sentence:** when Rostila says something "cannot be done", Miettinen
  points out that no mechanism prevents it — the issue is that it is not wanted. The distinction
  is fair and it is accepted.

**Positions and calculations that are not substantiated:**

- **"The tax ratio that inevitably falls."** Miettinen's claim is that a forecast decline in the
  tax ratio is a recurring justification that always leads to new rises — and that the decline
  never materialises. The claim is testable; the episode does not test it.
- **The Swedish comparison.** The claim that scaling Sweden's private-wealth trajectory to
  Finland would leave Finns with some €700 billion more in private wealth is made without
  showing the calculation. The magnitude is enormous and the working is missing; read it as an
  illustration.
- **Total dividends.** The figure given here is not consistent with what the same speaker gave
  in a 2023 episode. Neither is sourced, and the gap goes unexplained.

Miettinen's rhetorically strongest moment is not a number but an analogy: **when a business
loses a client it looks for new revenue — it does not demand the money back from the client.**
It is a sharpened comparison, but it makes the question visible: what is the public sector's
equivalent of adapting?

## Where both sides agree

Funding for the public broadcaster. The panel — including the governing-party MP — states that
the funding **can be cut without changing the law**, and that appealing to a cross-party
consensus is a shelter rather than an obstacle. The issue is not that it cannot be done but that
it is not wanted.

They also agree that the scale of adjustment is large compared with previous governments — and
Miettinen makes a good objection to that: **comparison with predecessors says nothing about
sufficiency** if the predecessors fell far short.

One point is awarded to the government unanimously: on the labour-market reforms it did not
bend under pressure.

## Second half: classification, ad revenue and trust

The last stretch is about a case in which a British publisher lost advertising revenue after
ending up on the risk list of an international index that classifies disinformation. The panel
say they watched a video about it and describe the case on that basis.

**The structural argument, and the most durable thing in the episode:** once a classifier's
definition of disinformation widens from "inaccurate information" to include content considered
harmful or divisive, the classification becomes **an assessment of position rather than of
fact** — and because it affects advertising money, it has financial consequences regardless of
whether the publisher's claims are true.

The argument does not depend on what one thinks of that publisher, and it can be answered.

**And then there are parts of the stretch that are not checked:**

- A claim about who funds the index, including a named individual, is made from memory and
  without a source. It is marked here as unverified and is not repeated as a claim.
- Characterisations of which publications ended up on the list rest on the same video.

The panel also makes an observation against itself in this stretch, and it is worth quoting:

> *"I'm not claiming the alternative media is any more reliable. It probably isn't."*

Their claim is therefore about the **ratio** of trust rather than about superiority: trust in
mainstream outlets is, in their view, higher than their accuracy earns — from which it does not
follow that the alternative is better.

The weakest part of the stretch is the claim about who gets interviewed and who does not. It
rests on one recollection of working at a think tank and a couple of examples. The claim may be
true, but as presented it is not demonstrated.

## Claims presented as claims

- The €700 billion figure in the Swedish comparison.
- The total dividend figure (inconsistent with the same speaker's earlier number).
- The claims about who funds the index.
- The claims about who is and is not heard in the Finnish press.
- Assessments of individual parties' negotiating motives inside the coalition.

## What survives the episode

1. **"Cannot" and "will not" are different things.** The correction is made mid-sentence, it is
   accepted, and it changes the terms of the rest of the hour. It is the best single moment in
   the episode.
2. **The time constraint is a real argument, but it is not permanent.** Statutory spending
   requires legislation — which means the legislation should have been started earlier, and both
   sides concede it.
3. **Print the ranking in brackets.** The smallest proposal in the episode is also its most
   feasible: if every tax carried Finland's international position beside it, the debate would
   start from a different place.
4. **The disagreement holds to the end.** Nobody gives way, and the episode does not pretend to
   a consensus — which makes it the most readable in the series.

## How the episode runs

- **00:52** — A warning: there will be shouting
- **01:40** — The line-up, and one empty chair
- **02:28** — The question the audience sent in
- **03:17** — €1.5 billion, and VAT at 25.5
- **04:03** — Rostila's answer, part 1: what was said before the election
- **04:54** — The threat of the deficit procedure
- **05:42** — A correction: cannot, or will not?
- **06:29** — "What would Milei do?"
- **07:18** — Why there was no alternative
- **08:31** — Criticism of the communication, not the decision
- **09:17** — The tax ratio that inevitably falls
- **10:04** — Who pays, and how much
- **10:55** — Bargaining power inside a coalition
- **11:44** — The mid-term review, and pressure from outside
- **12:31** — What the papers are writing at the same time
- **13:20** — Looking for new taxes
- **14:08** — The Swedish comparison and a wealth calculation
- **14:54** — Dividends as an order of magnitude
- **15:52** — Losing a client as an analogy
- **16:39** — Why the tax ratio never falls
- **17:30** — The opposition's alternative
- **18:17** — A proposal: put the international ranking in the budget
- **19:06** — What "taxes on high earners" means here
- **19:55** — When not taking is called spending
- **20:44** — Opposition rhetoric and the gender split
- **21:36** — The welfare state as a woman's party
- **22:32** — Net taxpayers and service use
- **23:19** — Tere arrives
- **24:05** — Arriving late as a tactic
- **24:52** — Every party has its favourites
- **25:39** — The corporatist inheritance
- **26:32** — Why not simply decide?
- **27:19** — Whose table the thirteen billion sits on
- **28:05** — The broadcaster: cuts without changing the law
- **28:59** — The limits on how fast cuts can be made
- **29:45** — Who the interest is paid to
- **30:33** — Liquidity and the bond market
- **31:18** — Statutory obligations first
- **32:04** — Why permanent rather than temporary?
- **32:51** — Preparation time in the ministry
- **33:42** — Whose fingers get hit
- **34:37** — An antifragile system
- **35:26** — The low-hanging fruit
- **36:22** — Coalition, polling, and the limit
- **37:15** — Who is already shouting
- **38:01** — The third sector's service obligation
- **38:52** — Comparing with previous governments
- **39:40** — A memory from 2007
- **40:27** — Sweden's choice and its result
- **41:33** — Where we start from
- **42:19** — The pension system as an explanation for wealth
- **43:06** — One point awarded to the government
- **43:55** — A publisher that lost its ad market
- **44:43** — How disinformation gets defined
- **45:34** — The definition widening
- **46:19** — The practical consequences
- **47:09** — Who funds the classifier
- **48:01** — The effect on public debate
- **48:48** — Trust in the mainstream press
- **49:49** — How the same story gets framed
- **50:39** — Is a neutral outlet missing in Finland?
- **51:26** — Who gets interviewed
- **52:13** — Who ended up on the list
- **53:00** — An observation about where disinformation starts
- **53:46** — Communications advice for the government
- **54:37** — Renaming as a political instrument
- **55:23** — What the opposition's silence says
- **56:14** — Sign-off