Society · first published 2023-06-04
The Coalition Talks | Sami Miettinen and Elli Harju on Puheenaihe 348
A media appearance. On Puheenaihe, hosted by Leevi Leivo, Iltalehti political journalist Elli Harju and Sami Miettinen review Finland's 2023 coalition negotiations in their fifth week, before any programme has been published. Harju opens up the daily routine at Säätytalo and why the motive behind a leak must always be assessed. Miettinen's running claim is procedural: the programme locks in too much in advance, and the Finnish fixation on a single defeated bill bringing down a government is incomprehensible. He forecasts that no other government can come out of this parliament, and reads the coalition on two axes: exceptionally coherent on economics, scattered on values. Harju disputes part of it. The single best observation is that the National Coalition chairs all eight reform tables and therefore writes the base papers. It closes on the Centre Party's choice, the leadership of Purra and Orpo, and both speakers' forecasts of what will actually change. Recorded 2 June 2023, published 4 June 2023.
The Coalition Talks | Sami Miettinen and Elli Harju on Puheenaihe 348
Summary: A media appearance. On Puheenaihe, hosted by Leevi Leivo, Iltalehti political journalist and producer Elli Harju and Sami Miettinen discuss Finland’s 2023 coalition negotiations, which at the time of recording are in their fifth week with no government programme yet. Recorded 2 June 2023, published 4 June 2023.
The media’s role in the negotiations
Harju’s description of the daily routine at Säätytalo is the most concrete part of the episode. Every morning about an hour of live broadcast is made from the doorstep, which the formateur Orpo and the other party leaders come to; there are press conferences in the evenings. Beyond that, background conversations with negotiators are actively sought, because few will reveal on the record what is coming out of the negotiating room.
Her own methodological rule is explicit: the motive must always be assessed. A leak may serve to speed things up, to signal to voters, or to explain in advance (“we did try for more”), and a party may want to signal dissatisfaction about the proportions of the cuts. But if the information is significant and considered reliable, it is reported, because it matters to convey to the public what official channels would rather not say.
She also raises the role of experts in public: when a representative of the employers’ confederation explains why work-based immigration must be increased, that prepares citizens for a painful decision.
Miettinen’s claim: the programme is too detailed
Miettinen’s running argument in the episode is procedural. The Finnish way of writing government programmes is, he says, naive: decisions that will play out over four years are locked in advance. His comparison is corporate strategy — there nobody micromanages measures four years ahead; you take the broad lines and choose the means along the way.
Harju’s answer is not disagreement but explanation. Orpo stressed building trust at the start of the talks; if trust were strong, a detailed programme would not be needed. That the programme is becoming meticulous precisely on climate and immigration tells you the trust is not there — each party wants its own share staked out now.
Miettinen attaches a second normative claim to this: the Finnish fixation on all government parties voting in favour, and a single defeated bill bringing down the government, is incomprehensible. He regards it as welcome that in the previous term the trans law passed with National Coalition votes and the EU package with opposition votes. Harju balances it: government work was not especially durable either when the majority-government convention was weaker — terms were short. Both land on the same point: voting bill by bill gives this government room if a second EU joint-debt package arrives.
Why no other government can come out of this parliament
Miettinen’s forecast — and it is a forecast, not knowledge — rests on a simple count: no other combination can be got out of this parliament, so this is also the government that will form. A blue-red coalition fails because Marin will not form a government with the National Coalition, and Lindtman’s election would have to be waited for until autumn — leaving a Belgian situation in which a government is awaited for half a year.
Harju adds two things. Marin is mentally on her way out, and it would be strange to see her at Säätytalo as an outgoing leader. And Lindtman’s aim is to be prime minister in four years, so he does not want a government that cuts now — he has declined ministerial posts so far. Leivo’s question here is the sharpest in the episode: if the Social Democrats want to be the prime minister’s party in four years, are they prepared for Finns to get four years of National Coalition and Finns Party policy? Harju’s answer is honest: it is harsh, but parties do calculate support — and reconciling the programmes would in any case be very hard.
A coherent economic right, a scattered values axis
Miettinen’s reading of the coalition base is two-axis. On the x-axis, economics, it is exceptionally coherent: he recalls nothing like it in Finland, not even Sipilä’s government, in which the Centre — in his characterisation now almost a left-wing party — was in charge. On the y-axis, national conservatism versus green liberalism, the spread is very wide, and that is where the trouble will come.
Harju disputes part of this. The Finns Party is not, in her view, an economic-right party in that sense: Purra has spoken of graduating earnings-related benefit but not of cutting it outright, and the differences of line are considerable. Miettinen sharpens his distinction: on taxes the Finns Party is as far right as the National Coalition, and on transfers too they want reductions — especially where the money goes to people other than their own, such as development aid. Harju’s counter concerns the electorate: the Finns Party’s range is wider than the National Coalition’s, it contains an older labour-market strand, and social security cuts are therefore not a simple matter for them.
Miettinen’s answer is institutional: governments are formed by MPs, not by the party’s union-background figures, who are not MPs.
Where the government will tear: climate and immigration
Both locate the same fault line. The price of fuel is a threshold issue for the Finns Party and collides with the climate targets of the National Coalition and the Swedish People’s Party. Miettinen’s assessment is that it will not amount to much: postponing the blending obligation is the same move the previous government made, and Marin’s government left the increase to the start of 2024 — in Harju’s words, the mine it left for its successor. On the rest of climate policy Miettinen predicts vagueness: the climate act will not be touched, the pace will be slowed, but the 2035 target will not be removed. His comparison is the 0.7 per cent of development aid, which nobody adopts but which gets passed on.
On work-based immigration Miettinen judges the Finns Party persuadable, provided humanitarian immigration falls. He also notes that nobody can prevent work-based immigration from within the EU, so the question concerns countries outside it.
Who wins at the table
Harju’s analysis of the negotiating set-up is the single best observation in the episode. The National Coalition chairs all eight reform tables. You cannot infer the outcome directly from that, but it determines what the base papers in those rooms look like — and the National Coalition has more professional expertise, history and tradition, and better-prepared papers. The Finns Party have improved, but not from equally strong ground. The Swedish People’s Party is small, ten MPs, but in a decisive position, so it may get a role larger than its size.
Miettinen agrees in a negotiator’s terms: whoever gets to write the papers is in a strong position, because they can make their own interpretations and steer the drafting. In the sub-groups other parties do carry responsibility.
The theory Leivo raises about experts as a tool gets partial confirmation from both: when hundreds of experts are heard — eight hundred was the figure discussed the week before — sheer volume creates an impression that shifts the balance. Harju notes that the National Coalition has far wider ties to the expert and interest-group world than the Finns Party, and that “expert” is a loose term. Miettinen’s counterweight: the spirit of the game lets the Swedish People’s Party and the Finns Party roll in their own, and the larger change is that corporate and union bodies have not been brought in to write the base texts, as has practically always been the case in Finland before — in the previous government union-background special advisers and lobbyists wrote a large part of the programme.
The Centre Party’s choice
Asked by Leivo whether the Centre’s categorical refusal surprised them, Harju says yes: its answer to the formateur was not an answer at all but a notice of going into opposition — even the Left Alliance answered the questions, though it knew it would not enter a government with the National Coalition. She doubts it was the strategically best move.
Miettinen’s reading is longer. The Centre’s big mistake was to make itself a left-wing party in the previous term, and the Social Democrats’ polarisation tactic worked. Now the Centre is permanently in the left bloc with no real way to raise support from opposition, because it would have to argue with left-wing arguments. Harju specifies the direction: the votes were lost specifically to the Finns Party, and the needling is already visible between individuals in parliament.
Miettinen also says plainly what he thinks of Sari Essayah’s tactics: she is a brilliant substantive politician who makes no noise but plays regional policy so that the wellbeing services counties get no taxation powers of their own. Harju’s observation on the same point: the Christian Democrats have not publicly set a single threshold condition, so they are not, publicly at least, a difficult counterparty.
Purra, Orpo and the Swedish People’s Party
Miettinen considers Purra a strong leader and backs it with a concrete example: when Putkonen had signed a trade union confederation paper, Purra reversed it mid-process. His assessment is that replacing Halla-aho with Purra was a smart move, because Halla-aho was damaged goods on the values axis. Harju balances this too: Purra carries her own baggage, having come into the party through Suomen Sisu, and texts can be found — but she has developed a great deal as a leader and comments to the press whenever asked.
Of Orpo, Miettinen says he is something of a teddy bear and a yes-man, but for that very reason a unifying force in a quarrelsome situation; a fiercer chief negotiator would have produced more incidents. For Finland’s brand he is not what Marin was.
On the Swedish People’s Party Miettinen’s forecast runs against the grain: although there is much agonising now about lost integrity, the party will shed its left-wing label, and if the values axis stays neutral, the shift to the economic right will be a winning move for it. Harju judges that this government will not make reforms improving minority rights — no trans laws, no Sámi Parliament acts.
Closing: what changes
Miettinen’s wish list is explicitly his own: end the rise in the tax rate, remove the solidarity tax, prune the spending side, introduce citizenship tests, and find some solution for health and social care other than not finding nurses and adding expenditure. But his own forecast is pessimistic: he would be surprised if taxation on employees or companies were eased during this term. The likelier scenario is that the debt trajectory is bent without it showing in a wage earner’s tax.
Harju’s forecast points the same way but is more cautious: economic policy moves rightward but slips towards the centre, because the National Coalition and the Finns Party do not agree on everything. Social security will see cuts at least through index freezes, and the Finns Party’s imprint will show in immigration policy and in cutting development aid. Her qualification matters: if income tax is cut but a reduced VAT rate rises, the net effect and who it falls on remain to be seen.
Harju’s worry is procedural: if agreement is this hard to find already in the negotiations, the term will be hard. Miettinen’s is the opposite — he is looking forward to a return of economic-policy sense, and regards the noise on the values axis as less critical.